Arthur Cyr told delegates at a China summit on Monday that the tensions now roiling global markets are less the product of Chinese policy and more a mirror of unilateral moves by Washington over the past seven years. "What we are seeing in Beijing is a direct reflection of choices Washington has already made," Mr. Cyr said, arguing that tariffs, broad export controls and industrial subsidies have compelled partners to hedge, decouple and diversify.

Cyr, a long‑time observer of U.S.-China economic relations, pointed to concrete policy shifts that have reshaped trade and investment. Since 2018, the United States has imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods under Section 301, while concentrated export controls on semiconductors and advanced manufacturing technology have tightened access to key inputs. The federal CHIPS and Science Act, which allocates roughly $52 billion in manufacturing incentives, and other subsidy programs have further signaled a pivot to industrial policy.

The summit discussion juxtaposed those moves with recent data on flows and market responses. Corporate supply‑chain surveys show a steady increase in diversification: a 2024 survey by a major consultancy found that nearly half of multinational firms were actively reducing China exposure in at least one tier of their supply chain. Investors have priced in that risk. Shares of semiconductor and equipment makers experienced bouts of volatility after successive rounds of U.S. export restrictions; the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index fell as much as about 2 percent on a day when new controls were widely anticipated.

Chinese officials, speaking at the conference, framed their response as defensive. A Foreign Ministry representative described Beijing's steps to secure key industries as "necessary measures to stabilize our economy and employment," signaling increased state support for strategic sectors. The clash of unilateral actions risks a cascade of policy responses beyond tariffs and controls: investment screening, reciprocal subsidies, and tighter local content rules that could raise costs for producers and consumers globally.

Economists at the summit said the cumulative effect is not only nearer‑term market volatility but a longer‑term structural bifurcation. Global trade in goods and services between the two economies still runs in the hundreds of billions annually, but private capital flows have cooled and foreign direct investment patterns are shifting toward Southeast Asia, Mexico and India. That reorientation carries efficiency losses; relocation and duplication of capacity are expected to raise production costs and, for some products, consumer prices.

Policy analysts in the room urged a recalibration: if the aim is to secure supply chains and preserve national security, they argued, a more multilateral, rules‑based approach could limit blowback. "Unilateral levers may buy time, but they also accelerate market fragmentation," one attendee said.

For businesses and markets, the summit underscored a clear implication: firms must plan for a future in which geopolitical risk is embedded in cost structures and investment decisions. For policymakers, the challenge is to balance strategic objectives with the economic consequences of unilateralism — a balance that will shape growth, prices and alliances for years to come.