The Dutch government is weighing plans to produce Raytheon’s AMRAAM missile domestically, an option that would mark a significant step toward onshore manufacturing of advanced guided munitions in Western Europe. The deliberation comes as nations reassess dependence on external suppliers for high-end weaponry and seek to secure maintenance, replenishment and upgrade pathways that align with alliance needs.

The AMRAAM, a beyond-visual-range medium-to-long-range air-to-air missile widely used by NATO air forces, serves both as a capability and a standard of interoperability. Local production would aim to preserve that interoperability while making supply lines less vulnerable to geopolitical disruption or production bottlenecks abroad. For the Netherlands, a country with a sizable aerospace and defense industrial base relative to its population, the proposal is pitched as both a strategic and economic decision: it could create skilled manufacturing jobs, retain technical know-how, and anchor related maintenance and upgrade services at home.

But converting a procurement relationship into a domestic production line is complex. It requires technology transfer agreements with the original manufacturer, investments in precision manufacturing and testing infrastructure, and regulatory approvals tied to arms-export controls. Specialized processes for rocket propulsion, guidance and seeker integration demand high levels of quality control and certification before munitions leave the factory. Those steps can take years and require a sustained political and financial commitment.

Export controls and licensing terms set by the United States, where Raytheon is based, present another hurdle. U.S. rules governing the transfer of military technologies can impose conditions on where and how components are manufactured, who can access sensitive design data, and whether products can be re-exported. Navigating that landscape will be essential for the Netherlands to realize any indigenous production without compromising security agreements with allies.

Beyond technical and legal barriers, domestic production raises strategic questions about burden-sharing and industrial policy within NATO. Proponents argue that national manufacture increases resilience and gives the Netherlands a seat at the table for future upgrades and variants. Critics caution that duplicating capacity among allies could be inefficient if demand is insufficient to sustain multiple production lines, and that investment should be prioritized toward emerging capability areas such as long-range fires, electronic warfare and unmanned systems.

Those capability shifts were on clear display at the U.S. Army’s recent AUSA conference, where modernizing artillery, next-generation weapons, and unmanned platforms dominated discussions. Pentagon initiatives like a new school for drone operators and trials of multipurpose Launched Effects illustrate how militaries are diversifying force structures as well as materiel. The Dutch deliberations over AMRAAM production should be read against that backdrop: nations now weigh the value of sovereign manufacturing against the need to pivot resources toward evolving battlefield concepts.

Whether the Netherlands proceeds will hinge on the outcome of technical assessments, negotiations with industry partners and political calculations about defense spending priorities. If pursued successfully, domestic AMRAAM production would be more than an industrial project; it would signal a broader European interest in cultivating sovereign capabilities while remaining embedded in NATO’s integrated defense architecture.