Pentagon Must Replace Chinese Display Technology by 2030, Lawmakers Say
A provision in the draft National Defense Authorization Act would force the Department of Defense to end reliance on display technologies sourced from China and other foreign suppliers by 2030, seeking to close perceived supply chain and security gaps in mission critical systems. The measure requires a long term assessment through 2040, a transition plan to domestic or allied suppliers, and regular progress reports to Congress, with implementation hinging on the president signing the final bill.
Congressional negotiators included a provision in the latest draft of the National Defense Authorization Act that would require the Department of Defense to eliminate use of electronic display technologies sourced from China and other countries of concern by 2030. The amendment directs the Pentagon to assess its display technology needs through 2040, identify components currently obtained from named countries of concern including China and Russia, and produce a multi year plan to shift procurement to domestic or allied suppliers.
The measure is framed by proponents as an effort to reduce supply chain vulnerability and prevent foreign control or manipulation of mission critical interfaces such as cockpit displays, ship and vehicle screens, and other operational touch points. It mandates periodic progress reports to Congressional defense committees and would become binding only if the president signs the final NDAA into law.
Implementation raises immediate policy and industrial questions. The Department of Defense will need to reconcile an accelerated deadline with the realities of a global electronics supply chain where major consumer electronics suppliers source components and final assembly from factories in China. Developing or scaling domestic production of advanced display panels typically requires significant capital investment, certification testing, and time to meet military specifications. The requirement to identify suppliers through 2040 creates a longer term demand signal, but the 2030 cut off compresses near term procurement timelines.
For procurement officials, the provision likely means accelerated spend planning, retooling of acquisition strategies, and potential renegotiation of contracts with major vendors that rely on Chinese factories. Defense contractors and original equipment manufacturers will face pressure to certify alternative supply lines or to demonstrate that components are sourced from allied nations. Allied industrial partners may see increased business, but governments will also confront export control and interoperability issues as suppliers shift production.
Congressional oversight is central to enforcement. The mandated progress reports create opportunities for hearings and for lawmakers to apply budgetary levers if the Pentagon falls short. The amendment also places political responsibility on the White House since the president must sign the NDAA to convert the provision into law. Lawmakers advancing the change cite national security concerns, while industry groups may press for more phased approaches or carve outs for components that cannot be readily replaced.
Beyond procurement and industrial consequences, the measure carries diplomatic implications. Naming China and Russia as countries of concern formalizes security perceptions and could prompt responses from trading partners and multinational suppliers. It will also test the capacity of U.S. industrial policy to rapidly expand secure electronics manufacturing without degrading military readiness during the transition.
As negotiators finalize the NDAA text, attention will focus on implementation details, funding timelines, and whether the Pentagon can meet the 2030 deadline without operational disruptions. The provision marks a decisive congressional push to harden supply chains, placing complex technical and industrial challenges squarely in the cross hairs of national security policy.
