A report by the London-based Royal United Services Institute concludes that growing military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is shortening the timeline for China to field forces capable of forcing Taiwan’s political reunification by military means. The authors identify a mix of materiel exchanges, technical assistance and training that, they say, could be applied to amphibious assault, air and missile campaigns, and the suppression of Taiwanese command-and-control systems.

High-ranking U.S. officials have separately warned that President Xi Jinping directed the People’s Liberation Army to be prepared for a possible invasion as early as 2027, an assessment that has prompted renewed urgency among U.S. and allied planners. “The confluence of Chinese modernization and Russian assistance materially changes the risk calculus for Taiwan and for the region,” the RUSI paper states, arguing that some systems transferred or co-developed with Russia have clear dual-use applications for a cross-strait campaign.

Beijing reiterated longstanding policy language in response to the report, saying Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China” and rejecting foreign attempts to “interfere” in the matter. The Chinese government has not publicly acknowledged any cooperation with Russia aimed at contingency operations against Taiwan and has framed its military modernization as defensive and directed at reunification through peaceful means when possible.

The RUSI analysis arrives against a backdrop of accelerated defense investment and technology development across Europe and the United States. Berlin’s announcement this month of a roughly $40 billion military-space package, the U.S. Air Force’s timeline for the new F-47 to fly in 2028, and rapid progress by the defense industry on autonomous systems and missile capabilities all reflect an international response to a more entangled security environment. Washington has also increased patrols and exercises in the Indo-Pacific and recently tested strategic systems, signaling a willingness to project deterrence while allies debate force posture and funding.

Policy implications are immediate and practical. Intelligence and export-control regimes face pressure to detect and disrupt transfers that could accelerate Beijing’s operational timelines. NATO and Indo-Pacific partners must reconcile different threat perceptions and procurement cycles to sustain effective deterrence without prompting uncontrolled arms escalation. Congress and allied parliaments will confront renewed pressure to fund Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses and to speed weapons deliveries that complicate any cross-strait operation.

For Taiwan, the report underscores the stakes of civic preparedness and political cohesion. Democratic debate within Taipei about conscription, reserve mobilization and civil defense could become decisive, as could public support for resilience measures that blunt initial offensive effects. In Washington, the issue threatens to sharpen bipartisan divides over military aid and strategic priorities ahead of looming domestic elections, even as both parties historically back measures aimed at deterring coercion in the Taiwan Strait.

The RUSI report is a wake-up call to policymakers who must now weigh accelerated military cooperation between authoritarian powers against the democratic institutions and alliance structures designed to deter coercion and preserve stability in an increasingly volatile strategic environment.