U.S. Tells European NATO Members to Lead Conventional Defense by 2027
Pentagon officials informed European diplomats that the United States expects European NATO members to assume the bulk of conventional defense responsibilities, including certain intelligence and missile capabilities, by 2027. The demand, delivered during Washington meetings on December 5, 2025, is intended to accelerate allied burden sharing and capability building, but several European delegations warned that production, logistics and reliance on U.S. unique assets complicate the transition.

Pentagon officials in Washington told visiting European diplomats on December 5 that the United States expects European NATO members to assume the majority of conventional defense duties by 2027. The demand covered a spectrum of capabilities, with officials highlighting intelligence collection and certain missile capacities as among the areas Europe should be prepared to take on. The accelerated timeline is part of a broader American push to force faster development of Europe’s defense industrial base and operational sovereignty.
The announcement sharpened a long standing transatlantic debate over burden sharing. European delegations received the message with concern, pointing to limited production lines, supply chain fragility, personnel shortages and continued reliance on systems that are primarily American. Delegations also flagged the logistical difficulty of expanding munitions, surveillance platforms and integrated air and missile defenses within the compressed timeframe.
U.S. leaders framed the push as a response to a changed security environment that demands more resilient allied capabilities. For many European capitals the prescription is familiar, but the rapid deadline moves the conversation from aspirational defense cooperation to concrete industrial and operational planning. Officials did not provide specific metrics or a formal mechanism for measuring progress, leaving open what benchmarks would trigger a rebalancing of responsibilities or continued U.S. support.
The demand has practical and legal implications. NATO’s collective defense obligations rest on capabilities possessed by the alliance as a whole, and rapid capability transfers will require careful legal review of export controls, technology sharing rules and industrial agreements. European countries will also have to reconcile national procurement laws and differing industrial strategies, while ensuring compliance with international arms control commitments.

European defense ministers are likely to focus on three intertwined tasks. First, scaling production of munitions and missile systems will require coordinated procurement, investment and workforce development across member states. Second, enhancing intelligence and surveillance capacity will necessitate shared architectures and data sharing agreements that respect national sensitivities. Third, logistics and sustainment must be expanded to support more independent operations on the continent and in adjacent theaters.
The European Union’s existing defense initiatives will be tested. Programs designed to pool procurement and finance cross border projects could be accelerated, but they will need membership buy in and sustained funding. Smaller states face particular strain, as they lack large defence industrial footprints and will be asked to contribute to collective capabilities rather than replicate U.S. systems domestically.
The United States, for its part, appears determined to delegate more of the day to day conventional burden to its partners while retaining strategic global assets. How that split will be managed in practice, and how progress will be assessed before the 2027 deadline, remain unanswered questions that will shape transatlantic security for years. The coming months are likely to see intensified diplomatic negotiations, technical assessments and contingency planning as NATO members work to reconcile political will with industrial reality.

