The White House has confirmed, on condition of anonymity, that U.S. officials are considering broad restrictions on software exports to China as part of a suite of measures intended to deter Beijing from following through on threats to curb rare-earth shipments. The acknowledgment came after a Reuters report saying policymakers were weighing actions similar to those imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The deliberations underscore how strategic materials such as rare earths have become leverage in great-power competition. U.S. decision makers are exploring whether limiting access to advanced software and digital tools could blunt China’s capacity to develop or deploy technologies that depend on those critical inputs, an approach aimed at imposing costs without resorting to conventional tariffs or kinetic confrontation.

Washington’s internal debate touches on sensitive legal and trade questions. Export controls would be framed as national security measures, invoking authorities developed over recent years to limit the transfer of semiconductors, equipment and other items deemed critical. Yet imposing broad software curbs—potentially affecting anything from specialized engineering packages to cloud-based development platforms—would test existing legal frameworks and raise questions about compliance with international trade rules. It would also heighten scrutiny of how far the United States can restrict intangible technology flows without breaching norms governing digital trade and intellectual property.

The potential move also reflects a wider recalibration of U.S. policy toward China, blending economic pressure with diplomatic engagement. Reuters’ reporting and the White House acknowledgement arrive as political leaders on both sides prepare for meetings in the coming months, where trade, Taiwan and technology are likely to feature. Beijing’s growing use of export controls as leverage — particularly in sectors where it holds dominant positions — has prompted Washington to consider reciprocal tools that do not depend solely on tariffs or sanctions.

For multinational companies the prospect of expanded software restrictions introduces fresh uncertainty. Firms that rely on global development teams, cloud services and cross-border collaboration face the prospect of fragmented markets and complex compliance burdens. Supply chains that already adjusted to chip controls and other export measures would need to prepare for constraints on the software and services that underpin product design, manufacturing and cloud-based operations.

Internationally, allies and partners will watch closely. Any U.S. move could prompt parallel policies from European and Asian governments concerned about technology flows and supply-chain resilience. It could also accelerate efforts in third markets to reduce reliance on contested components and software, potentially spurring regionalization of critical technology sectors.

The debate in Washington is likely to remain fluid as officials weigh the strategic benefits against the diplomatic costs and legal complexity of broad restrictions. What is clear is that the intersection of rare earths, software and global supply chains has become a new front in U.S.-China competition, with implications that extend beyond bilateral relations to the global architecture of technology governance.