Supreme Court weighs whether inmate found intellectually disabled can be executed

The Supreme Court is hearing argument today in a case that will test the boundaries of protection for defendants found to be intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution. At issue is whether Alabama can proceed with the execution of Joseph Clifton Smith, now 55, who was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1997 killing after a lower court concluded he is intellectually disabled.

The dispute focuses on the evidentiary tools courts may use to determine intellectual disability in capital cases. Lower courts in Smiths case relied on a body of IQ testing and expert evaluations that defense lawyers say demonstrate long term cognitive impairment and deficits in adaptive functioning. Alabama officials argue those findings do not meet the state standard for intellectual disability and have asked the high court to allow the execution to go forward. The Justice Department filed a brief backing Alabama in the appeal.

Legal scholars and observers say the case could clarify whether courts may consider multiple IQ scores over a span of years and how much weight to give expert clinical judgment about adaptive behaviors and life functioning. The question echoes earlier Supreme Court decisions that have shaped intellectual disability doctrine in capital cases. The Court established in Atkins v. Virginia that executing intellectually disabled persons violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Subsequent rulings addressed the role of rigid numerical IQ cutoffs and state procedures, leaving unresolved tensions over the interplay between raw test scores and clinical assessment.

If the justices narrow the evidentiary baseline for proving intellectual disability, the ruling would likely reduce judicial deference to cumulative testing and clinician testimony. That shift would have practical consequences for defendants whose test results fall in a borderline range or whose impairments manifest inconsistently across time and contexts. Conversely, a decision affirming the lower court could expand the circumstances in which cumulative evidence supports a finding of disability and preclude execution in a broader set of cases.

Beyond the doctrinal stakes, the case highlights administrative and procedural questions facing state courts and corrections systems. Determinations of intellectual disability involve expert evaluations that can be time consuming and costly, and disparate state standards have produced uneven outcomes for similarly situated defendants. A Supreme Court ruling could prompt legislative or regulatory responses at the state level, including adjustments to assessment protocols, record keeping, and the timing of postconviction review.

The case also intersects with broader debates about finality, procedural fairness, and the role of federal authorities in state death penalty administration. The Justice Department brief in support of Alabama signals federal interest in the resolution, and the ruling could shape how federal courts review state determinations going forward.

As the Court considers Smiths appeal, lower courts, practitioners, and rights advocates are watching for guidance that will influence not only one inmate's fate but the standards that govern intellectual disability assessments across the nation. The decision is likely to have immediate legal consequences and to prompt policy discussions about the interaction of psychological science, legal doctrine, and the administration of capital punishment.